February 14, 2007

All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer



This book provides an excellent starting place for anyone who wants to understand the United States' relationship with Iran. It covers the events surrounding the US-backed overthrow of Iran's democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. At first, it might sound like this book exists to blame the US for its actions in Iran and point out how they have come back to haunt us, but while that's definitely a lesson to take from the book, this is a solid history.

There's no strict timeline in the book; the focus is on several different players over time. The story begins with British oil interests in Iran which coalesce into the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The name may imply partnership, but the British steadfastly opposed allowing the Iranians any more involvement than manual labor. The book also covers Mohammed Mossadegh's life and rise to power. Mossadegh was and still is a central figure in Iranian history. If his government hadn't been overthrown, Iran might now be a moderate democracy experiencing growth pains instead of a repressive Islamic state ruled by tyrants. The central conflict of the book was Mossadegh's decision to nationalize Anglo-Iranian in 1951, a decision that sent the British into paroxysms of self-righteous rage. Ironically, the British had nationalized industries shortly before in the name of national interests.

From then on, the story was full of British intransigence, and Iranian stubbornness. The British kept hoping they could use the Shah to overturn Mossadegh and absolutely refused to accept the truth of the situation in Iran. Their entrenched racism comes through quite clearly in quoted documents. In truth, the British come off looking pretty ridiculous throughout it all. They certainly had some claim to remuneration, but since they were pretty much exploiting Iran's people and natural resources, the reader won't be highly sympathetic to their claims. The British also unfairly bullied the US on the issue. Truman showed remarkable restraint in trying to work out a diplomatic solution, but the unwillingness of both sides to compromise doomed his efforts to failure.

The coup actually doesn't take up much of the book, because even though it was central to the story, it was a relatively minor event. Unlike other coups, this one didn't dissolve the government, but rather put it back in the hands of the Shah. The Shah comes across as a vain, cowardly man who, although he desired a modern and moderate Iran, was unwilling to do it the right way through transitioning to a democratic government. He believed in his divine right to rule (and surely felt justified when his SAVAK secret police killed dissenters).

The United States' role in the coup is laid out in detail in this book. With the shift in administrations from Truman to Eisenhower, the US took a different tack. The Eisenhower administration placed first importance on containment of the Soviets and the British painted Iran as ripe for a Marxist takeover (it wasn't). The Dulles brothers decided that supporting Britain was in the US' interests, and from then on pressured Eisenhower to allow them to do something about it. It was only a matter of time before he gave in. Kermit Roosevelt, CIA agent and grandson of the famous President Theodore Roosevelt, was almost single-handedly responsible for bringing about the coup. He made the arrangement, found the contacts, and spread the money around.

If you've ever wondered why Iranians marched around the US embassy shouting "Death to America" or "Death to Carter" or "America is the Great Satan", this book is the place to start. The "popular" uprising against Mossadegh was nothing more than mobs and thugs paid off by Kermit Roosevelt's agents to march against him, and in one stroke Iran was taken off the path of Democracy and freedom and began its slow decline into the Islamic tyranny that it is now, where full-body coverings for women are mandated by law and journalists that speak against the Imam may be beaten. It's true that we didn't directly do that to Iran, but it's also true that we made it possible for it to happen.

Judgments aside, this is a great compact history of the coup, its prelude and its aftermath. I'm sure there are larger, more comprehensive ones, but surely none this concise and well written and interesting to read. Given Iran's place in the papers these days, I suggest you start reading.

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